SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing" we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
AGENCY

OBLIGATED TO REFUND

STATUTORY AUTHORITY-In

-

FEES-

FEES
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RESTITUTION-

STATE

COLLECTED IN EXCESS OF

re State Board of Dentistry, 84 N.J.

582, 423 A.2d 640 (1980).
On November 6, 1975, the Board of Dentistry (Board) proposed
an increase in the registration fees for its members pursuant to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 45:1-3.2 (West 1978). 84 N.J. at 584, 423 A.2d at 641.
Since the enabling statute limited authorized charges in the aggregate
to the estimated operating expenses of the Board, the New Jersey
Dental Association (Association) promptly requested information concerning such expenses. Id. Although the Board reported that estimated receipts would exceed estimated expenses by $27,300, the fee
schedule was adopted and became effective January 14, 1976. Id. at
584-85, 423 A.2d at 641-42.
The Association immediately sought review of the Board's regulation, but did not seek a stay thereof pending appeal. Id. at 585, 423
A.2d at 642. The appellate division ultimately invalidated the regulation on the ground that it violated N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-3.2. The
appellate division, however, did not rule upon the Association's request for a refund of fees paid under the regulation. 84 N.J. at 585,
423 A.2d at 642. After several unsuccessful motions and denial of a
petition for rehearing on the issue of a refund, the Association petitioned the New Jersey supreme court for certification. Id.
The supreme court granted certification to consider whether a
state agency, which promulgates a fee schedule that is adjudicated
ultra vires pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-3.2, is obligated to
refund the excess fees collected. 84 N.J. at 586, 423 A.2d at 642.
Analogizing to a long line of New Jersey authority requiring a refund
by the taxing entity when a tax previously collected is judicially set
aside, the court held that a refund was mandated under the theory of
restitution to prevent unjust enrichment of the Board. Id. at 587, 423
A.2d at 643. The appropriate refund was held to be limited to the
excess of the fees collected over the Board's actual expenses during
the years in question. Id. at 586 & n.2, 423 A.2d at 642 & n.2.
In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed the volunteer
rule, which generally provides that a party who voluntarily pays
money pursuant to a legally unenforceable demand cannot obtain a
refund. Id. at 588, 423 A.2d at 643. In the opinion of the court that
rule was rendered inapplicable based on the facts that the Association's members paid the fees under protest, the matter was promptly
brought to the attention of the appellate division, and the members
were statutorily required to pay the fees under N.J. STAT. ANN.
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§ 45:6-13 (West 1978) in order to legally continue their practices. 84
N.J. at 588-89, 423 A.2d at 644. The court also held that the refund
was not barred by the appropriations clause of the state constitution,
N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. VIII, § II, para. 2, even though the Board
had deposited the fees in the state treasury pursuant to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 45:1-3. This conclusion rested on the current appropriations
act, L.1980, c.56 (S.1309, of 1980), in which the legislature set aside
a fund out of which amounts improperly credited to the state treasury
as state revenue were to be refunded. 84 N.J. at 590, 423 A.2d at
644.
BANKS AND BANKING-CHECKS--FORGERYLIABLE

FOR PAYMENT OF "DOUBLY

DRAWEE BANK

FORGED" CHECKS

DRAWN BY

v. Colonial First National
Bank, 176 N.J. Super. 101, 422 A.2d 433 (App. Div. 1980).
FAITHLESS

EMPLOYEE-Brighton, Inc.

Norman Hirschfield, an employee of a group of real estate firms,
embezzled over $300,000 from his employer's bank accounts in a
check cashing scheme which he perpetrated between 1973 and 1978.
Having some authority to sign his own name to company checks as
drawer, Hirschfield made the checks payable to actual creditors of his
principals, but only to those who had no existing claims against his
principals. In some instances, Hirschfield also forged the name of a
principal as drawer, presumably when the amount of a check exceeded his own power to authorize. In every case, he forged the
indorsement of the named payee and cashed the checks at either a
depository-collecting bank or a payor-drawee bank. The depositorycollecting bank, having no bank-depositor relationship with Hirschfield's employer, received payment from the payor-drawee bank,
which in turn debited the appropriate account of the employer. 176
N.J. Super. at 106, 422 A.2d at 435. On June 21, 1978, the employer
notified the drawee banks that the accounts had been wrongfully debited regarding the checks bearing only forged indorsements. Notification regarding the checks bearing forged drawer's signatures as
well as forged payee indorsements, the so-called "double forgeries,"
was made on July 17, 1979. The last forged check had been cashed in
April, 1978. Id. at 107, 422 A.2d at 436.
The employer, as the ostensible drawer of the instruments,
brought suit and asserted various claims against each of the banks
who acted in some capacity in the collection process. The plaintiff
sought recovery against the payor-drawee banks that also cashed
Hirschfield's checks for the wrongful payment of forged checks on
theories of negligence and conversion. Against the one drawee bank
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that did not cash any checks for Hirschfield, the plaintiff claimed that
its account had been wrongfully debited with respect to the checks
bearing only forged indorsements. As to the depository-collecting
banks, the plaintiff sought recovery for payment of both classes of
checks on theories of negligence, conversion, and monies had and received. Summary judgment was entered in favor of each of the defendant banks by the Law Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey in Monmouth County. Id. at 108, 422 A.2d at 436.
In the instant decision, the appellate division affirmed the judgments in favor of the payor-drawee banks. The court affirmed the
judgment in favor of the depository-collecting banks only with respect
to the forged checks. It allowed the plaintiff to amend its pleadings to
allege facts underlying claims of fraud and conspiracy upon remand as
against one depository-collecting bank; the reversal in this one instance limited to checks bearing only forged indorsements. Id. at 121,
422 A.2d at 443.
Regarding the claims asserted against the payor-drawee banks for
wrongful payment of forged checks, the court held that these were
barred as untimely by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:4-406(4) (West 1962)
[hereinafter all statutory references are to N.J. STAT. ANN., Title 12A
(West 1962 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981)]. By § 4-406(4), a customer has
the duty to inspect his bank statement to discover and report his
unauthorized signature within one year and an unauthorized indorsement within three years of receipt of the statement. The court, in
accordance with the interpretations of other jurisdictions, held that
§ 4-406(4) is not merely a statute of limitations, but a substantive rule
which absolutely bars a customer's claim against his bank. In response to the plaintiff's contention that § 4-406(4) did not bar independent causes of action, the court stated "that the sine qua non for a
drawee bank's liability to its customer is payment of an item . . . not
otherwise properly payable." § 4-401(1). Whatever form the claim
may take-whether negligence, conversion, breach of contract, or
monies had and received-the court found that the claim was rooted
in § 4-401(1) and was, thereby, subject to the time restrictions of
§ 4-406(4). 176 N.J. Super. at 108-11, 422 A.2d at 436-38.
A check bearing the forged indorsement of the payee is not
properly payable under § 4-401(1). The plaintiff, accordingly, claimed
that the drawee banks improperly debited its account with respect to
those of Hirschfield's checks that bore only forged payee indorsements. While some of these claims survived the three-year time restriction of § 4-406(4), their fate was equally doomed under the "fictitious payee" rule. Normally, a forged indorsement is ineffective to
pass title to the instrument upon which it appears. If the person signing
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on behalf of the drawer, however, intends the payee to have no
interest in the instrument, then the indorsement of any person, even
that of the drawer-forger, in the name of the named payee is "effective" to pass title. § 3-405(1)(b). The rule is designed particularly to
impose the loss generated by a faithless employee upon the employer
and not its bank because it is believed that the employer is better
equipped to prevent or protect against the fraudulent activities of its
employees. The checks bearing only forged indorsements were,
therefore, properly payable. 176 N.J. Super. at 112-14, 422 A.2d at
438-39.
Regarding the drawer's claims against the depository-collecting
banks on the double forgeries, the court distinguished between the
divergent effects which flow from each kind of forgery. Since an item
bearing the forged signature of the drawer is not properly payable
under § 4-401(1), the loss for such checks falls upon the drawee bank.
On the other hand, under the fictitious payee rule of § 3-405(1)(b),
the loss for checks forged by a faithless employee in the name of the
payee falls upon the ostensible drawer, the employer. In reconciling
these opposing consequences, the court held that doubly forged
checks are to be treated simply as forged checks-those bearing only
forged drawer's signatures-for purposes of fashioning a remedy. 176
N.J. Super. at 115, 422 A.2d at 440. Hence, the loss for the double
forgeries falls upon the drawee because such checks are not properly
payable under § 4-401(1). The forged indorsement of the payee will
not operate, contrary to the fictitious payee rule, to convert a forged
check into a genuine one, that is, one which is effective to pass title.
176 N.J. Super. at 115, 422 A.2d at 440. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff's loss on the double forgeries accrued not when the collecting bank cashed the check using its own funds, but rather when the
drawee bank debited its customer's account. Moreover, the loss is
only paid once because the payee is "fictitious" and, therefore, will
not appear to collect payment from either the employer or the collecting bank. Id. at 116-17, 422 A.2d at 440-41.
With respect to the checks bearing only forged payee indorsements, the court held, in spite of various policy arguments marshalled by the plaintiff, that the fictitious payee rule sufficed to disallow any claim for such checks against the depository-collecting
banks. Id. at 120, 422 A.2d at 442. As an exception to this ruling, the
court did allow the drawer to proceed against the collecting bank for
a cause of action sounding in conspiracy or actual fraud. Viewing an
allegation of actual complicity between the forger and one collecting
bank, the court held that commercial dealings which approach the
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criminal realm cannot be immunized by the Uniform Commercial
Code. Id., 422 A.2d at 443.
The true interest of the present decision lies in the court's treatment of the so-called double forgeries-that hybrid which bears the
potential for divergent consequences under the Code. The fictitious
payee rule may not serve to alter the rules that govern the relationship between the payor bank and its customers; in this instance,
that the drawee may only pay an item in accordance with its customer's order.
CRIMINAL LAW-

SENTENCING-

PERSONS SERVING MANDATORY

LIFE SENTENCES FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER UNDER FORMER LAW
NOT ENTITLED

TO SENTENCE

RECONSIDERATION

UNDER

CODE-

State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 423 A.2d 294 (1980).
In 1975, John Maguire was found guilty of first degree murder.
Pursuant to the statute in effect prior to the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice (Code), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-1 to -98 (West 1980),
Maguire was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. 84
N.J. at 511, 423 A.2d at 295. The Code now permits a person incarcerated under former law to petition the court for reconsideration
of that sentence if the offense "has been eliminated by the Code" or
if the person was "sentenced to a maximum term . . . which exceeds
the maximum established by the Code for such an offense." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-1(d)(2) (West 1980).
After reviewing Maguire's petition, a resentencing panel composed of three superior court judges concluded that Maguire was entitled to sentence reconsideration under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-1(d)
(2). The majority determined that to establish eligibility for reconsideration, the Code's maximum murder sentence should be interpreted
as "the 30-year maximum term set out in the murder provision itself,
N.J. S[TAT. ANN. §] 2C:11-3(b), rather than the maximum extended
term of life imprisonment under N.J. S[TAT. ANN. §] 2C:43-7(a)(1)."
84 N.J. at 512, 423 A.2d at 296. In consideration of the several hundred individuals serving life sentences under the former law who
would be affected by the decision, the resentencing panel stayed its
decision and the supreme court granted direct certification. Id. at
513, 423 A.2d at 246.
The supreme court determined that no one convicted of first degree murder under pre-Code law and now imprisoned for life is entitled to sentencing reconsideration under the Code. Id. at 511, 423
A.2d at 295. After careful examination of the statutory language and
legislative history of the Code, the court concluded that the

SURVEY

1981]

maximum term for murder under former law did not exceed the
new maximum employed in the Code. The court rejected Maguire's
proposition that in the absence of the "enhancement criteria" required for
an extended sentence, the maximum term for murder is thirty years

pursuant to N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:11-3(b). 84 N.J. at 519, 423 A.2d at

300. The court recognized that although the enhancement criteria of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 had to be met in most circumstances for
extended terms, the last sentence of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(b)
read in conjunction with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7, specifically permitted a court, under the Code, to sentence an individual convicted
of murder for a period between thirty years and life imprisonment

without meeting the additional standards of N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:44-

3. 84 N.J. at 522, 423 A.2d at 301. Thus, under the Code, an individual found guilty of murder is eligible for the same maximum term
of life imprisonment as under former law. The court concluded that
Maguire and similarly situated defendants, therefore, would not be
entitled to sentence reconsideration. Id. at 526, 423 A.2d at 304.
The court also rejected Maguire's argument that a life imprisonment sentence under the Code is discretionary and "should not operate to preclude sentence review for persons who received a manda-

tory life sentence under former law." Id. Although N.J.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 2C:1-1(d)(2) attempts to reduce the disparity in treatment of individuals sentenced under prior law and those sentenced under the
new Code, the court did not believe the legislature intended to differentiate between mandatory and discretionary sentences. The court
concluded that life imprisonment was the same for all persons
whether they were convicted of first degree murder by a jury and
given mandatory life sentences or convicted on a plea of non vult and
given such discretionary life sentences under former law, or whether
they were given a discretionary life sentence under the Code. 84 N.J.
at 528-29, 423 A.2d at 305. Therefore, the fact that a person was
imprisoned for a mandatory life sentence did not persuade the court
that their sentence was any more severe than a discretionary life
term. The court observed if that contention were "logically extended," all discretionary sentences allowed by the Code would exceed "that provided for under prior law," and this in no way was the
intent of the legislature. Id. at 529, 423 A.2d at 305.
The Maguire court thus has limited the scope of the Code's resentencing consideration provision consistent with the legislature's intent, statutory interpretation, and public policy. To allow all defendants serving a mandatory life sentence for first degree murder under
former law to be eligible for resentencing consideration under the
Code would be too great a burden for the courts and for society.
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OF STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION TO IMPOSE

ON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT UPHELD-In

re

Board of Education of Trenton, 176 N.J. Super. 553, 424 A.2d
435 (App. Div. 1980).
Following administrative hearings and a decision by the Commissioner of Education, the State Board of Education (State Board)
issued an administrative order imposing upon the Trenton Board of
Education (Trenton Board) a plan for corrective action aimed at remedying "educational deficiencies in the district school system." 176
N.J. Super. at 556, 424 A.2d at 436. Authority for the action taken by
the State Board was based on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-14, 15 (West
Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). Upon appeal by the Trenton Board, the
appellate division of the superior court affirmed.
Justice Matthews, writing for the unanimous court, reviewed the
provisions of the corrective plan which provided for, inter alia, the
appointment by the Commissioner of Education of a monitor general
to act as a general supervisor over the school district and the assumption by the school district of the cost for the services of the monitor
general. 176 N.J. Super. at 559, 424 A.2d at 437. Broad supervisory
powers over the local district were given to the monitor general and
county supervisor. Those powers included the approval of any budget
increase and the authority to direct the district's personnel to take all
necessary actions to ensure that thorough and efficient programs in
special, compensatory, and bilingual education were operated. Id. at
560, 424 A.2d at 438. Although the monitor general and the county
superintendent were required to present all staffing recommendations
to the Trenton Board for formal approval, the corrective plan prohibited the Trenton Board from tabling the recommendations, directed
that a roll call vote be conducted, and mandated that a board member's objection to any recommendation must be recorded. Id. The
Trenton Board was required to submit regular reports "detailing
progress in meeting the requirements of the plan." Id.
The Trenton Board first challenged the power granted to the
State Board by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-15 to impose a corrective
plan as so lacking in "standards and guidelines . . . as to constitute an

unlawful delegation of legislative power to the State Board." 176 N.J.
Super. at 561, 424 A.2d at 438. Acknowledging that the authority
granted to the State Board by the statute is broad, the court, however, pointed out that "[t]he exigencies of modern government have
increasingly dictated the use of general rather than minutely detailed
standards." Id. at 562, 424 A.2d at 439. The court emphasized that
the existence of "procedural safeguards, plus legislative, judicial or
executive checks" is a crucial factor "in determining whether a grant
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of power to an administrative agency is invalid because of lack of
proper limitations upon agency discretion." Id. The court then delineated the numerous safeguards that accompany the grant of power
under N.J. STAT ANN. § 18A:7A-15, most notably the requirements
for notice and a hearing prior to the taking of any corrective action;
the regulations prescribing the manner in which the hearing is to be
conducted; and the right to appeal to the superior court. The existence of these safeguards led the court to conclude that there was no
improper delegation of power. 176 N.J. Super. at 563, 424 A.2d at
440.
The Trenton Board also argued that the State Board exceeded its
statutory authority in appointing the monitor general and in delegating a wide range of powers to him and to the county superintendent. The court disagreed, viewing those actions of the State Board
to constitute the proper exercise of powers "that may be readily inferred from Title 18A," and which are "reasonably necessary and
appropriate to effectuate the commissioner's statutory responsibilities." Id. at 563-64, 424 A.2d at 440.
Addressing the contention that the Trenton Board could not be
forced to assume the cost of the monitor general's services, the court
conceded that the appointee was technically a state employee, but
denied relief. That denial was based on the proposition that even
though the monitor general would be acting solely for the school district of Trenton, the local district is "in actuality . . .a creature of the
state instituted as the agent to carry out the constitutional mandate to
educate our young." Id. at 565, 424 A.2d at 441.
The Trenton Board further alleged that their members' right to
free speech was violated by the order forcing them to state on the
record their objections to personnel recommendations. The court dismissed that argument stating that since the board members act as
public officers in a quasi-judicial capacity, they are required to state
the reasons for their decisions. Id.
Finally, the Trenton Board contended that their members were
denied due process because the State Department of Education investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated its case. Id. The court found
that argument to be without merit since no actual bias on the part of
the hearing officer was alleged, and the fact that an administrative
agency both initiates and adjudicates a case does not, without more,
constitute a due process violation. Id. at 565-66, 424 A.2d at 441.
The opinion of the court illustrates the broad powers of the State
Board and Commissioner of Education to impose a corrective plan
when deficiencies in the provision of educational programs by a local
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school district are established. The court's proposition that in actuality a local school district is a "creature" and "agent" of the State for
the carrying out of the constitutional mandate that a thorough and
efficient education be provided, Id. at 565, 424 A.2d at 441, is farreaching and should cause concern among home-rule advocates. This
proposition is, however, consistent with the modern trend in New
Jersey supreme court decisions initiated by Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975), whereby emphasis is placed on how local decisions, planning, and organization impact on regional and statewide mandates.
INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION -ADOPTIONINTESTATE

INHERITANCE

FROM

NATURAL

FATHER

RIGHT OF

DETERMINED

BY

NEW JERSEY LAW IN EFFECT AT TIME OF ADOPTION OF CHILD-In

re Estate of Avery, 176 N.J. Super. 469, 423 A.2d 994 (App.
Div. 1980).
Harry D. Avery, a resident of Manchester Township, New
Jersey, died intestate on July 1, 1979. Certain members of decedent's
family, two brothers, two sisters, and a nephew, brought an action for
a declaratory judgment that they were the sole heirs of the decedent,
seeking to exclude Julia Ann Avery, his natural daughter. Ms. Avery
had been adopted by a maternal aunt in New York with the consent
of the decedent in 1932, after the death of her mother. 176 N.J.
Super. at 471, 423 A.2d at 995. The trial judge dismissed the complaint on a motion for summary judgment finding that respondent
had a right to inherit from decedent. Id, at 476, 423 A.2d at 997.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate division
analyzed the legal issues surrounding the right of intestate inheritance of adopted children. The court first examined the question of
which law should govern an intestate disposition of decedent's property, declaring it to be "the law of the state of decedent's domicile at
the time of death." Id. at 471, 423 A.2d at 995. The court reasoned
that the law of the state of death of an intestate also determined
whether the right of inheritance of an adopted child had been preserved or terminated. Id.
After deciding that New Jersey law was applicable, the court recognized that statutory provisions displacing the common law right of
inheritance would govern. Id. at 472, 423 A.2d at 995. The right of
Ms. Avery to inherit, however, turned upon which law controlled the
situation, the statute presently in effect terminating an adopted
child's rights except upon adoption by a stepparent, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-50(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) or the statute in effect at
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the time of respondent's adoption preserving an adoptee's right of
inheritance from a natural parent, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30 (West
1976) (amended 1977). 176 N.J. Super. at 472, 423 A.2d at 995. The
trial judge utilized the latter provision, thus preserving the right of
inheritance of respondent. Id. at 473, 423 A.2d at 996.
By applying the law in effect at the time of adoption, New Jersey
courts reached a result based on statutory construction and judicial
interpretation contrary to many other states' decisions. Id. at 475, 423
A.2d at 996-97. Similar issues were decided in Nickell v. Gall, 49
N.J. 186, 229 A.2d 511 (1967), and In re Estate of Neuwirth, 155
N.J. Super. 410, 382 A.2d 972 (Monmouth County Ct. 1978), where
the courts determined that the laws and any amendments thereto
were prospective in effect, and declared that any post adoption
changes in the law will not affect the adoptee's right of inheritance.
176 N.J. Super. at 475, 423 A.2d at 996.
The 1977 amendment in question on this appeal was passed by
the legislature without an express intent to make it retroactive, despite the lawmakers' knowledge of previous judicial rulings on the
subject. The appellate division interpreting Nickell, Neuwirth, and
the statute, found the 1977 amendment codified in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-50(a) to be prospective only and held that the rights of Julia Ann
Avery were not affected or terminated by that statutory provision.
176 N.J. Super. at 475, 423 A.2d at 997.
JURISDICTION -

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-FOREIGN
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Coons v. Honda Motor Co., 176 N.J. Super. 575,
424 A.2d 446 (App. Div. 1980).
LIMITATIONS-

Walter P. Coons was seriously burned in a fire resulting from an
accident in which he was thrown from his 1972 Honda CB350
motorcycle on October 30, 1974. Defendant, American Honda Motor
Co., Inc. (American Honda), a wholly owned subsidiary of the appellant designer-manufacturer, Honda Motor Co., Ltd. of Japan (Honda
Ltd.), subsequently discovered a defect in the model's gas filler cap
release mechanism and, thereupon, advised the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration of its decision to recall the defectively
designed motorcycles. 176 N.J. Super. at 578, 424 A.2d at 447.
While American Honda claimed it had notified all 1972 Honda CB350
owners of the defect in December, 1977, the respondent disavowed
receipt of any notice or actual knowledge of the recall until being so
advised by his neighbor in July, 1978. Id.
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The complaint against American Honda was filed on October 30,
1978, and the company was promptly served with process in New
Jersey where it was authorized to conduct business. Id. The lower
court, applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952), granted summary judgment in favor of American Honda because the filing exceeded the two year statute of limitations. The decision was affirmed
on appeal. 176 N.J. Super. at 581, 424 A.2d at 449.
Service of process on appellant Honda Ltd., however, was not
effected until 1979 when the court permitted the company's Washington-based law firm to be served as the agent of a foreign corporation.
Id. at 577, 424 A.2d at 447. Honda Ltd. contended that the court
lacked in personam jurisdiction because "minimum contacts" had not
been established between the corporation and the forum state. Id. at
578, 424 A.2d at 447. Furthermore, the corporation argued that even
if the standard had been satisfied, the plaintiff's filing of the claim
beyond the statutory limitations on actions rendered it invalid. Id.
Honda Ltd. suggested that the high visibility and accessibility of
Honda dealers throughout the state necessitated a finding that service
of process upon one of these several agents could easily have been
effected within the statutory period. Id. at 582-83, 424 A.2d at 450.
Appellate division Judge Polow, speaking for the court, affirmed
the earlier decision denying the appellant's motion to dismiss. Id. at
581, 424 A.2d at 449. It found that sale of negligently manufactured
products in the forum state through an exclusive distributorship
establishes the requisite "minimum contacts." Id. at 578, 424 A.2d at
447. Additionally, the absence of a representative agent of the foreign
corporation tolled the statute of limitations embodied in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:14-22 (West 1962), thereby preserving the plaintiff's claim.
176 N.J. Super. at 583, 424 A.2d at 450.
Addressing the jurisdictional issue, the Coons court noted that
the Supreme Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), recognized in personam jurisdiction over a defendant
who was not in fact present in the state, but had maintained "minimum contacts" sufficient to satisfy due process considerations. 176
N.J. Super. at 579, 424 A.2d at 448. The trend to expand in personam jurisdiction is justified on the basis of the corporation's profit
motive activities in the state, and the expectations of consumers that
local warranty standards protect against seller's abuses. Id. at 580,
424 A.2d at 448-49.
Reviewing New Jersey court decisions utilizing the minimum
contacts tests, the court stated that an in personam jurisdictional
claim against a manufacturer and distributor who enjoy an active and
economically fruitful relationship "does not offend the concepts of fair
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play and substantial justice." Moreover, due process standards, as
well as notions of fairness, do not shield foreign producers who knowingly engage in interstate commerce from escaping liability for negligently manufactured articles. Id. at 579-80, 424 A.2d at 448.
The court distinguished the holding in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), in which the Supreme Court
concluded that the New York-based corporate defendant was not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in Oklahoma, the scene of the car accident, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had purchased the car
in New York while residing there. Id. at 287. Quoting Justice White,
the Coons court found its holding consistent with the dictum in
World-Wide Volkswagen and distinguished the facts on that basis. It
reasoned that, unlike that situation, the Honda parent-subsidiary
arrangement involved extensive New Jersey sales from which significant economic benefits to both defendants accrued. 176 N.J. Super.
at 580, 424 A.2d at 448.
In its alternative argument, Honda Ltd. alleged that the action
was barred by the two year statute of limitations since it was "amenable to service" during that period. The court responded that under a
companion provision, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22, the statute is tolled
for the purpose of serving process during the period in which the
foreign corporation is not represented in the state. 176 N.J. Super. at
581, 424 A.2d at 449. Relying upon Justice Pashman's analysis in Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980),
the court refused to equate the statutory language "not represented in
the state by any person or officer upon whom a summons or other
original process may be served" with "not amenable to service." 176
N.J. Super. at 582, 424 A.2d at 449. In Velmohos, Justice Pashman
pointed out that the purpose of a subsequent amendment to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22 was to specifically exempt "[floreign corporations licensed to do business in New Jersey" from the tolling provision. 176 N.J. Super. at 582, 424 A.2d at 450. The court concluded
that unlicensed foreign corporations, although amenable to long-arm
jurisdiction within the statutory period, are subject to the tolling of
the statute. Id. See Comment, The Tolling Provision of the Statute of
Limitations-A Haven for the Dilatory Plaintiff, 10 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 585 (1980). Thus, the court rejected the notion that the service
rule could be applied to bring the appellant within the protection
afforded by the statute of limitations, noting that the presence of
'" 'minor functionaries' " such as the several New Jersey Honda dealers did not satisfy the requirement that an agent represent the corporation for service of process. 176 N.J. Super. at 583, 424 A.2d at
450.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:629

Finally, the court refuted the appellant's equal protection claim
by recognizing rationality in the different classifications of foreign corporations based on the "degrees of difficulty in effecting service." Id.
In Coons, the court demonstrated its continued unwillingness to
allow foreign manufacturers to avoid responsibility to its local market,
despite the recent Supreme Court pronouncement in World-Wide
Volkswagen restricting the establishment of in personam jurisdiction.
Instead, it will permit equitable considerations to tip the balance in
favor of a narrow interpretation of that decision. Consistent with that
reasoning is the reluctance of the court to extend protections afforded
by the statute of limitations to foreign corporations who have not, at
the very least, appointed agents for service of process within the
state.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANTS

LACK

STANDING

TO

Brook Gardens
Tenants Association v. Rent Leveling Board of Belleville, 177
N.J. Super. 1, 424 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1980).
CHALLENGE RENT LEVELING ORDINANCE-Branch

Belleville tenants recently challenged the grant of a "hardship"
rent increase to their landlord. Under Belleville's rent leveling ordinance, the Belleville Rent Leveling Board may authorize a hardship
rent increase where a landlord cannot realize a ten percent return on
investment. 177 N.J. Super. at 6-7, 424 A.2d at 842-43. The Board
granted such an increase to the landlord after a public meeting was
held on February 8, 1979. Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at 841. Since the
tenants failed to commence their action within forty-five days of the
February 8th meeting, the trial judge ruled that the suit was not
timely.
In upholding that decision, the appellate division stated that
although the trial judge enjoyed discretion to expand the time limitation, N.J. CT. R. 4:69-6(c), use of this discretionary provision would
have been improper in this case. Judge Greenberg, writing for the
unanimous court, reasoned that since at least some tenants had been
represented by counsel at the public meeting, the tenants were
aware of their legal rights. Moreover, Judge Greenberg ruled that the
"complaint did not raise substantial factual or legal questions." 177
N.J. Super. at 11, 424 A.2d at 845.
After rejecting plaintiff's claim that the ordinance was "unworkable," the court held that the tenants had no standing to challenge
the hardship provision in any event. Id. at 14, 424 A.2d at 846. The
court reached this conclusion by reasoning that since no state or
federal law required Belleville to pass a rent leveling ordinance and
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since the municipality could discontinue rent control, tenants had no
standing to assert that a hardship provision permits an unreasonable
rate of return. Judge Greenberg stated, ".no matter how much of an
increase is allowed it cannot exceed that permitted in an uncontrolled
market." Id.
Judge Greenberg failed to cite any landlord-tenant cases to support the proposition that tenants had no standing to challenge the
hardship increase. Instead, the court cited two search and seizure
cases for support. United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980);
State v. Parker, 153 N.J. Super. 481, 488, 380 A.2d 291, 294 (App.
Div. 1977).
The court went on to distinguish other litigation concerning rent
increase and limitation provisions. According to Judge Greenberg,
those cases were challenges by landlords that the ordinances in question were confiscatory. The court held that tenants have no right to
rent limitation. 177 N.J. Super. at 15, 424 A.2d at 847. In essence,
then, landlords may challenge a provision as confiscatory but tenants
may not challenge the same provision as allowing unreasonable rent
increases.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

-PENSION

PENSIONER ENTITLED TO SIMULTANEOUS

PLANS-REEMPLOYED
RECEIPT OF PENSION AND

OF STATUTORY PROHIBITION-Bierne v. Employees' Retirement System of Jersey City, 176 N.J. Super. 146,
422 A.2d 456 (App. Div. 1980).
SALARY IN ABSENCE

In 1974, Francis X. Bierne retired from the post of tax collector
on a disability pension from the Employees' Retirement System of
the City of Jersey City (Retirement System). Bierne was subsequently
rehired by Jersey City in 1977 for the salaried position of Director of
Finance. At the close of that year, the Retirement System passed a
resolution proscribing simultaneous receipt of pension benefits and
earnings, and stopped making pension payments to Bierne. 176 N.J.
Super. at 149, 422 A.2d at 458.
Plaintiff, upon his second retirement in 1979, unsuccessfully
sued to recover back pension payments from the date of the 1977
Retirement System resolution. Arguing that the administrative regulation was contrary to statutory provision, and therefore ultra vires,
plaintiff pursued an appeal to the New Jersey superior court, appellate division. Id. at 150, 422 A.2d at 458.
The issue considered by the court was whether concurrent payments of salary and pension are permissible when a public employee
is rehired in a position covered by his former retirement system.
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Judge Pressler, writing for the appellate division, reversed the decision of the trial court, ruling in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 154, 422
A.2d at 460-61.
The court found that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:3C-1 (West Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981) adopted upon the repeal of a blanket prohibition
against simultaneous payments, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:3-1 (West 1962)
(repealed 1968), was limited to instances of reemployment under
different retirement systems. 176 N.J. Super. at 150, 422 A.2d at
459. Judge Pressler interpreted N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:3C-1 as permitting concurrent payment of pension benefits and earnings, but denying readjustment of the original pension based on the second employment. 176 N.J. Super. at 150, 422 A.2d at 459.
Noting the absence of a provision under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:
3C-1 for reemployment under the same system, the court reviewed the pension provisions of other retirement plans, and concluded that the dual issues of simultaneous payment and pension
reenrollment were to be legislatively determined for each individual
system. 176 N.J. Super. at 150, 422 A.2d at 459.
In view of the general allowances of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:3C-1,
the court deemed retirement acts not containing such legislative prohibition to permit concurrent payment of benefits and salary, including instances of reemployment within the same system. The court
found that only an express statutory provision would have the requisite authority to prohibit double payment, or to allow pension reenrollment and subsequent readjustment of benefits. 176 N.J. Super. at
151-52, 422 A.2d at 460.
The governing pension act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:13-22.1 to
-22.65 (West 1962 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), does not provide for
either situation. In addition, the court considered the maximum age
restriction for enrolling in the Retirement System and concluded that
"a Jersey City retiree who is rehired by Jersey City is in precisely the
same situation as is a retiree to whom N.J. S[TAT. ANN §] 43:3C-1 is
applicable." 176 N.J. Super. at 152, 422 A.2d at 460.
The court noted that potential denial of concurrent payment of
salary and disability pension, as provided for in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:
13-22.55(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), was limited to disability
pensioners who did not otherwise satisfy the age and service requirements for retirement. 176 N.J. Super. at 152-53, 422 A.2d at 460.
Since this statute did not apply to Mr. Bierne, the appellate division
remanded the case to the trial court for calculation of the pension
benefits owed. Id. at 154, 422 A.2d at 461.
The Bierne decision thus provides a further reaffirmation of the
role of the legislature in determining public pension-related policy. It
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also underlines the need for the legislature to resolve disparities within that policy.
MUNICIPAL
ACQUITTED

CORPORATIONS -POLICE-POLICE
BY

JURY

OF

CRIMINAL

CHARGES

OFFICER

ENTITLED

TO

REIMBURSEMENT BY CITY FOR LEGAL EXPENSES INCURRED IN

DEFENSE-Valerius v. City of Newark, 84 N.J. 591, 423 A.2d

988 (1980).
Gerard Valerius, a Newark police officer, was indicted on or
about November 12, 1975, by the Essex County Grand Jury. The
indictment centered around allegations that Valerius, along with
another officer, Vincent Squatrito, took part in a transaction with two
individuals, Vincent DiModica and Raymond Carl Freda, who
arranged a proposed sale of hashish to two buyers for a price of
$23,000. At the time of the proposed sale, Officers Valerius and
Squatrito purportedly appeared and confiscated both the $23,000 and
the hashish on behalf of the Newark Police Department and feigned
an arrest of DiModica and Freda. It was alleged that there was no
hashish and that the entire transaction was merely a plan to lead the
victims to believe that their money and the hashish were seized by
the police department. The officers did not file any reports regarding
the alleged incident, nor was any money turned into the police department. 84 N.J. at 593, 423 A.2d at 989.
The indictment charged Valerius with misconduct in office, conspiracy to take money under false pretenses, and taking money under
false pretenses. Id. Valerius was informed of the indictment by the
Internal Affairs Division of the Newark Police Department and
advised to seek legal advice. No reference was made to the city furnishing him with an attorney or the permission needed before retaining his own attorney. Id. at 594, 423 A.2d at 989.
Valerius retained George Schneider of the Newark law firm, Zazzali, Zazzali & Whipple, to represent him, and was told the fee
would be approximately $10,000. Schneider notified Internal Affairs
that he was representing Valerius and due to the nature of the
charge, misconduct in office, an acquittal would require that the city
pay his legal fees based upon N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A: 14-155 (West
1980). Schneider testified that this was the current practice even
though he had been retained without prior city approval. 84 N.J. at
594, 423 A.2d at 989.
The criminal trial concluded in a not guilty verdict by the jury.
Mr. Schneider then submitted a $10,851 itemized bill to the City of
Newark for services rendered to Valerius. After the city's refusal to
pay, Valerius and Zazzali, Zazzali & Whipple filed suit against the
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City of Newark for $20,000, the alleged value of the legal services
rendered. Id. at 594, 423 A.2d at 990.
At trial, despite the city's defense that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14155 required official permission which was not obtained by Valerius
before employing private counsel and the claim that the statute
violated the N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. IV, § VII, para. 9, as special
legislation which only benefitted police officers, the court found for
the plaintiffs. The court concluded that counsel was entitled to
$18,275 based on a reasonable value of his services as determined by
expert testimony. 84 N.J. at 595, 423 A.2d at 990.
The appellate division reversed, finding that the applicability of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-155 was dependent on the charges in the
indictment. They concluded the statute did not apply because the
indictment arose out of a dereliction of his job responsibilities and not
as an incidence to the performance of his duties as a police officer.
The court found Valerius' acquittal was immaterial because the
obligation to provide defense counsel for the officer arose before the
complaint was prosecuted and, therefore, before the outcome was
known. 84 N.J. at 595-96, 423 A.2d at 990.
The New Jersey supreme court reversed and remanded for entry
of judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $10,851. The court emphasized
that Valerius was acquitted of all charges against him. Therefore, his
conduct came within the language of the statute since it "ar[ose] out
of or [was] incidental to the performance of his duties." Id. at 597,
423 A.2d at 991. The court also rejected the city's contention that
Valerius failed to follow established procedure by not obtaining official permission before retaining private counsel because there was no
proof that Valerius was aware of these formal procedures but was
simply following a common practice. Id.
In rejecting a literal interpretation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14155, the court determined that when an officer has legal proceedings
instituted against him and it is not clear whether they stem from
performance of his official duties, the officer can retain private counsel and be reimbursed by the municipality if he is acquitted of the
charges and such charges appear to have arisen out of the performance of his duties. The interpretation reflects the court's view of the
legislative intent of the statute. 84 N.J. at 598-99, 423 A.2d at 992.
The court distinguished the above application of the statute from
a situation where charges against an officer definitely arose from the
performance of his duties but involved alleged excessive use of his
authority. Township of Edison v. Mezzacca, 147 N.J. Super. 9, 370
A.2d 511 (App. Div. 1977). In such a case the statute would automatically require the municipality to provide the necessary means of
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defense without waiting to see the outcome of the action. It is in a
situation such as Mezzacca where the municipality's statutory obligation to provide counsel only requires a means of defense and does not
necessarily extend to payment for private counsel retained by an
officer unless there was a prior agreement with the municipality
according to established procedures. 84 N.J. at 597, 423 A.2d at 991.

With regard to the city's allegation that N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40A:

14-155 constitutes special legislation and, therefore, is unconstitutional under N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. IV, § VII, para. 9, the court
reasoned that the statute was general legislation with a rational basis
because the nature of police officers' duties exposes them to civil or
criminal actions, regardless of the merit of such actions. 84 N.J. at
599, 423 A.2d at 992.
Finally, the court addressed the trial court's finding of the
$18,275 amount due for legal services and determined that counsel
fees should be limited to $10,851, the amount of the bill originally
submitted to the City of Newark. Id. at 600, 423 A.2d at 992.
The decision of the New Jersey supreme court in Valerius v. City of
Newark was a necessary one. As pointed out by the court in defending the constitutionality of the statute, police officers' duties continually expose them to civil or criminal actions, some of which have
no merit. The city's refusal to reimburse an officer who was forced to
defend himself in a criminal proceeding when he was found innocent of
all charges would work a severe injustice by forcing an officer to assume
a burden as a result of carrying out his job for the city. The innocence of an officer is material in determining that the situation arose
out of or incidental to the performance of police duties and, therefore, must be taken into consideration when determining the application of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-155.
PERSONAL

INJURIES-NEGLIGENCE-

GENERALLY

APPLICABLE FOR INJURIES

STRICT LIABILITY

NOT

TO INVITEE ON BUSINESS

PREMISES CAUSED BY CONDITION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-Dixon
v. Four Seasons Bowling Alley, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 540, 424
A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1980).

On October 12, 1975, Ilene Dixon entered the defendant's bowling alley in order to bowl. Because she did not own a bowling ball,
Mrs. Dixon selected one of the balls made available to bowlers by the
defendant. Prior to her selection, she examined seven to ten balls
and noticed most of them were chipped and scratched. While bowling, she fell and cut her finger on a chipped portion of the ball she
had selected. 176 N.J. Super. at 543, 424 A.2d at 429.
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Mrs. Dixon and her husband brought an action against the owners of the bowling alley claiming that the accident was caused by the
condition of the premises and the condition of the ball. The action
was bifurcated as to issues of liability and damages. Id. at 543, 424
A.2d at 429. At the liability trial, the judge submitted the case to the
jury on both negligence and strict liability theories. On the negligence count, the jury decided that both parties were negligent but
apportioned 80% of the negligence to Mrs. Dixon, thereby precluding her recovery. On the strict liability charge, however, the jury
found the defendant liable but determined that each party contributed 50% to the accident, thereby limiting recovery by the plaintiffs
to 50% of the damages. The plaintiffs were granted a substantial recovery at the damage trial. Id. at 544, 424 A.2d at 429-30.
Judge Greenburg, writing for the appellate division, reversed the
decision of the trial court. He recognized that while the doctrine of
strict liability is usually applied in actions against manufacturers and
sellers, attempts have been made to expand the doctrine to situations
involving the use, but not the sale, of personal property. Id. at 545,
424 A.2d at 430. Reviewing past cases in which plaintiffs contended
that strict liability should be applied even though the situations did
not involve sales of property, the court concluded "that strict liability
should be imposed in favor of an invitee on a business premise only if
appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case." Id. at 546, 424
A.2d at 431. In the instant case, the circumstances included the facts
that Mrs. Dixon selected the ball without assistance or reliance on
the defendant, and the ball was used only for a short time on the
premises without additional charge. The court, therefore, concluded
that "the use of the ball was incidental to the use of [the] premises,"
and refused to impose strict liability. Id. at 547, 424 A.2d at 431.
The reluctance of the court to expand the doctrine of strict liability
limits the possibility of recovery by invitees on business premises for
injuries caused by the condition of personal property. This disposition
is consistent with the development of strict liability theory restricting
the doctrine to transactions and sales of defective products placed in
the stream of commerce rather than applying it to the use of personal
property, barring special circumstances.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-TRANSFER TO POSITION
WITH

REDUCED SALARY EXPECTANCY

NOT VIOLATIVE

OF TENURE

RIGHTS OF SCHOOL EMPLOYEE-Williams v. Plainfield Board of
Education, 176 N. J. Super. 154, 422 A.2d 461 (App. Div. 1980).

Jeanette Williams served as the tenured principal of Plainfield
High School for a four year period beginning in February of 1972.
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Because of certain deficiencies in her performance, the Plainfield
Board of Education transferred Ms. Williams to the nontenureeligible position of administrative assistant in the school district's central office in February, 1976. Four months later the Board assigned
the petitioner to her present position as principal of Emerson
Elementary School. In this capacity Ms. Williams' initial salary remained at the amount she earned as principal of the high school;
however, subsequent salary increments were calculated using the
lower pay scale for elementary school administrators of 1.4 times the
base teacher's salary rather than the 1.76 ratio used for high school
principals. 176 N.J. Super. at 156-57, 422 A.2d at 462.
In July of 1976, Ms. Williams appealed to the Commissioner of
Education charging that reassignment to the school district office and
transfer to Emerson Elementary School violated her tenure status. At
a hearing held in June and August of 1977, the hearing examiner
deemed the initial transfer valid despite the Board's noncompliance
with certain voting requirements since formal ratification did occur after the transfer had been effectuated. The hearing examiner then determined that the Plainfield Board of Education was fully empowered
to transfer teachers and administrators to positions of differing responsibility as long as the change did not result in an immediate salary reduction. Id. at 157, 422 A.2d at 462.
The Commissioner of Education disagreed with the hearing examiner's conclusions, finding instead that the Board could neither
transfer tenured employees to nontenure-eligible positions nor reassign them to positions with lower salary expectations. Id.
The Plainfield school authorities contested the Commissioner's
ruling by appealing to the State Board of Education which similarly
found that tenured administrators may not be relocated to unrecognized positions without the transferee's consent. Despite the impropriety of Ms. Williams' assignment to the post of administrative
assistant, however, the State Board firmly decided that the transfer
from high school principal to elementary school principal was a permissible lateral move which did not violate New Jersey statutes since
there was no loss of tenure status or reduction in compensation. The
State Board could discover no statutory mandate which prohibited
decreases in salary expectancy and "specifically overruled any prior
decisions which had read an expectancy requirement into the transfer
and tenure statutes." Id. at 158-59, 422 A.2d at 463.
Ms. Williams requested that the appellate division reverse the
State Board's treatment of the salary expectation issue on the grounds
that a transfer to a position with a lower salary expectancy effectively
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amounts to a reduction in rank and is violative of the rights of a
tenured employee. Id. at 159, 422 A.2d at 463.
The appellate division first acknowledged that tenure statutes
were enacted in order to provide employment security to teachers
and principals who have given the requisite years of service. Id. The
court then strictly construed the prohibition on reduced compensation outlined in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-5 (West 1968) and found
that the statute was not designed to afford tenured employees a
vested right to future salary increases. 176 N.J. Super. at 162, 422
A.2d at 465.
Quoting from Kopera v. West Orange Board of Education, 60
N.J. Super. 288, 298, 158 A.2d at 842, 847 (App. Div. 1960), that
"[t]enure is a status, a protection, not a contract," the court found
that an employee's status as a tenured or nontenured employee is
totally unrelated to his or her rights to increases or promotions. 176
N.J. Super. at 162, 422 A.2d at 465. The court refused to hold that
the lawful transfer of Ms. Williams to a position of equal responsibility violated her tenure status simply because the new post carried a
lower salary expectancy. Id.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-JURISDICTION -PIP

CARRIER

ENTITLED TO INITIATE PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE RIGHT TO DEDUCT
COLLECTIBLE WORKERS'

COMPENSATION

BENEFITS FROM

PIP

BENEFrrs-Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Para Manufacturing
Co., 176 N.J. Super. 532, 424 A.2d 423 (App. Div. 1980).
Wilma Pavuk was injured in an automobile accident on August
19, 1976. She filed a claim for PIP benefits which were subsequently
paid by Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Aetna), the appellant herein.
Pavuk did not petition for workers' compensation benefits. 176 N.J.
Super. at 533, 424 A.2d at 424.
The laws of New Jersey provide that PIP carriers may deduct
from their benefits the "benefits collectible" from certain collateral
sources, including workers' compensation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6
(West 1973). As a result of Pavuk's failure to petition for workers'
compensation benefits, Aetna filed a claim in the Division of Workers' Compensation "as PIP carrier for Wilma Pavuk." 176 N.J. Super.
at 533, 424 A.2d at 424. Aetna based its claim on Solimano v. Consolidated Mutual Ins. Co., 146 N.J. Super. 393, 369 A.2d 533 (Law
Div. 1977), which provided that a PIP carrier could ensure its right
of deduction by filing a workers' compensation petition in its own
name once it had paid the full PIP benefits to the claimant. 176 N.J.
Super. at 534, 424 A.2d at 424.
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The respondent, Pavuk's employer, was successful in its motion
to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 533-34, 424 A.2d
at 424. In dismissing Aetna's petition, the judge of compensation,
Henry J. Byrne, refused to follow Solimano, stating that it conflicted
with the decisions of the New Jersey supreme court in Conway v.
Mister Softee, Inc., 51 N.J. 254, 239 A.2d 241 (1968) and Ansede v.
National Gypsum, 73 N.J. 444, 375 A.2d 649 (1977). Aetna appealed.
176 N.J. Super. at 534, 424 A.2d at 424.
The appellate division, in a per curiam decision, concluded that
the Division of Workers' Compensation has the jurisdiction to hear
petitions "filed by PIP carriers as subrogees of injured employees," to
determine the right of the employee to workers' compensation benefits, and to determine the amount of those benefits "for the purpose
of computing the deduction authorized under N.J. S[TAT. ANN. §]
39:6A-6." 176 N.J. Super. at 537, 424 A.2d at 426. The court stated
that the decisions rendered in Conway and Ansede did not apply to
the facts of the matter under review because they involved joint or
successive employees. Id. at 535, 424 A.2d at 425.
The court noted that the workers' compensation carrier was statutorily responsible for any benefits claimed by reason of work-related
injuries. Therefore, since Aetna had paid all benefits due to the
claimant including those which may have resulted from work-related
injuries, Aetna had a derivative right to file a petition against the
carrier. In initiating a proceeding for workers' compensation benefits,
Aetna was acting as a subrogee of the claimant. Id. at 535-36, 424
A.2d at 425.
Although Judge Milmed, in his dissent, interpreted the language
in Aetna's petition as a demand that the workers' compensation carrier pay any compensation that might be due to the claimant, id. at
539-40, 424 A.2d at 427, the majority held that the relief being
sought by Aetna was a determination of both the claimant's right to
benefits and the amount of those benefits so that the deduction provided for under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6 could be computed. 176
N.J. Super. at 536, 424 A.2d at 425. The court reasoned that, since
the Division of Workers' Compensation is the only body empowered
to make such a determination, any decision holding that the Division
lacked such power would subvert the legislative plan to fund PIP
benefits primarily by "benefits collectible under Workers' Compensation Insurance" as provided under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6. 176
N.J. Super. at 536-37, 424 A.2d at 425-26.
The decision in this case of first impression for the appellate division indicates a strong conviction on the part of the court to fulfill the
legislative intent not to allow PIP benefits to be used as a substitute
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for benefits collectible under workers' compensation insurance.
Should an employee-claimant choose, for any reason, not to file for
workers' compensation benefits, the PIP carrier who has paid benefits
to him has the right to institute a workers' compensation proceeding.

